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TEXTS OF STATUTES

Rule 103'a)and(d"
Rule

>'

:

"W

.V CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

"-/.es of Evidence

^"l1" ^J7( "^ evidc-

la . . n.
^ tuLuneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
dence u:.1- *
substantial right of the party is
(1)Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if" the specific ground was not apparent
from the context; or
(d)Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.
Rule 609(a) Utah Pulos ul Evidence.
Rule LI!1...1" , Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime.
(a)General rule
For the purpose of attacking t 1 —
credibility of a wi tness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a cri rue shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (l)was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting lit lis
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2)involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether defendant waived his right to appeal for

failure to make a contemporaneous objection.
2.

Whether the court erred in admitting evidence of a

prior conviction under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.
3.

Whether the error was harmless, if the Court were to

find error.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

CASE NO. 900177-CA

GLENN E. HOLTMAN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable
Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake City,
State of Utah.

A jury found Mr. Holtman guilty of Retail Theft,

a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinances,
§11.36.060 after a trial held on January 24, 1990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 28, 1989, the defendant and his brother went
into the Nordstromfs department store at the Crossroads Mall in
downtown Salt Lake City.

At the time he entered the store,

defendant had in his possession a pair of pink and black
sunglasses. (T.29) Ms. Susan Bradley, a Nordstromfs security
agent, observed defendant enter Nordstromfs and head directly to
the sunglasses display case.

He spoke to a sales clerk and

several pairs of glasses were removed from the case for his
inspection. (T.3,29)

Ms* Bradley continued to observe defendant for
approximately ten minutes bcscause she felt that his mannerisms
were suspicious.

He paid an inordinate amount of attention to

the other people in the department, observingr what they were
doing, and looking at the salespeople who were quite busy.

(T.4)

Ms. Bradley also testified that defendant spent a considerable
amount of time "switching" the glasses back and forth.

She

described the defendant as laying his glasses next to the store's
glasses, trying on a pair, then hooking them to his clothes,
looking around and then switching them back and repeating the
process with his own or another pair of glasses.

(T.5)

At this same time, unbeknownst to Ms. Bradley, Mr.
Scott Alsop, also a Nordstrom's security agent, was watching the
defendant.

Mr. Alsop also testified that defendant seemed very

nervous and spent a lot of time looking around while at the
display case trying on glasses.

(T.12-15)

defendant for seven to ten minutes.

He observed the

(T.16)

At this point, Ms. Bradley became aware of Mr. Alsop
and another unidentified agent and told them she was going to
back off a little from defendant since her closeness might be
making him nervous. While talking to the other agents, Ms.
Bradley continued to watch defendant.

He picked up the store's

glasses and hooked them on his coat, put his old pair in the box,
turned the box upside down so the contents could not readily be
seen, and left the department.

(T.4,6,7)

Ms. Bradley went to the counter and picked up the box
defendant had set down and found a pair of badly beat-up,
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scratched glasses.

(T.7) She notified Mr. Alsop that a switch

had been made and Mr. Alsop, along with the other agent, followed
defendant to the third floor and stopped him as he left
Nordstroms.

(T. 15,16)

Defendant claimed, both at the time of the arrest and
at trial, that he had mistakenly walked out with what he believed
were his glasses.

(T. 8,32)

Although the defendant's glasses

were a different brand than Nordstrom's, both pair were hot pink
and black and similar in appearance except for their condition.
Prior to defendant's testifying, defense counsel moved
to exclude evidence of defendant's prior felony conviction for
Grand Larceny.

Argument was heard on the motion outside of the

jury's presence.

Defense counsel proffered as the facts of the

felony conviction that defendant acted as the middleman for a
friend who was stealing cars and who knew a "fence" for the cars.
Defendant did not know the "fence" and merely carried the keys
from his friend to the "fence".

(T. 21,22)

The court stated in its ruling that any admission of a
prior felony conviction would have a potentially damaging effect
but that the probative value in this case outweighed the
prejudicial effect.

The court stated that since intent was the

only issue and since intent can only be judged by an individual's
actions, the prior conviction was relevant to the issue of
credibility where defendant had claimed mistake as his defense to
both theft charges.

The court ruled that the prosecution was

entitled to address the witness' veracity and the prior
conviction had sufficient probative value to be brought up for
impeachment purposes.

(T. 23,24)

Defense counsel made no objection to the court's
ruling.

At the conclusion of his direct examination of

defendant, defense counsel elicited the following testimony:
Q.

Have you ever had a prior felony conviction?

A*

Yes, I have in Virginia about July 6th of last
year.

Q.

What was the crime?

A.

Grand Larceny. (T.32) (Inaudible responsereconstructed by stipulation of the parties).

This was the only reference to defcmdant's conviction.
The prosecution did not refer to the prior conviction during
cross-examination and neither party referred to it in closing
argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant's failure to make a contemporaneous,
specific objection to the court's ruling precludes appellate
review.

Moreover, defense counsel chose to raise the issue as

part of his direct examination rather than risk the prosecution
raising the issue as impeachment.

This was a legitimate trial

strategy that should not be second-guessed by the Court.
The trial court did not err in ruling that the prior
conviction would be allowed as impeachment.

The judge

specifically found that the* information was probative on the
issue of credibility.

In addition, the defendant's participation

in the auto-theft scheme involves dishonesty.

Even if this court

were to determine that the lower court erred, the error was
harmless.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAIVED THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and (d) and case law require
that counsel make specific objection to any error in the
admission of evidence or that the error be plain before an
appellate court will review the claim on appeal. Absent plain
error, there must be a contemporaneous objection to justify
appellate review.

State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 532 (Utah Ct.

App. 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12,15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Defense counsel failed to object on the record to the
trial court's ruling thereby waiving the issue on appeal. Absent
an objection, the Court must then consider whether the trial
court erred in admitting the prior conviction and whether such
error constituted plain error.

Even assuming this Court were to

find error, it would not constitute plain error such that it
should have been obvious to the trial court.

Ross, 782 P.2d 532^

Although Judge Grant did not clearly state that Grand Larceny is
a crime involving dishonesty, his statement that if the facts
were different his ruling might be different and that he believed
the prosecution to be addressing the witness' veracity indicates
the court believed that defendant's prior conviction involved a
crime of dishonesty and was, therefore, admissible as to
credibility.
We're dealing in both these cases with
what the intent was within the mind of
the individual which really can only
be judged by outward activities and

tendencies a very difficult decision.
Difficult I think, sufficiently so,
that the information of prior
conviction and the facts pertaining
thereto would be very important in
[the] determination of this jury as
to the believability of the witness.
So I think it is in point in this case
if it were, well if the facts of this
case were different, then I may be, it
may be a different aspect, but that's
the observations of the court and I
think under those circumstances the
prosecution is addressing the issue of
the veracity of the witness and they
appear fairly similar. So, I think my
position would be that it is of
sufficient probative value for the very
important issue before the court as the
past conviction may be brought up as
impeachment. (T.24) (Portions
inaudible - agreed to by stipulation.)
Not only did defense counsel not object to the
admission of the prior conviction, he elicited the information
from defendant as part of the direct examination.
referred to at any other point in the trial.

It was never

This was a

legitimate trial strategy of the defense and the defendant should
not be allowed to predicate a claim of error upon its own
evidence.
POINT II:
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR
FELONY CONVICTION UNDER RULE 609
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) specifically allows evidence of
a prior conviction involving dishonesty or false statement to be
automatically admitted for purposes of impeachment.

This does

not, however, answer the question whether theft crimes are crimes
involving dishonesty.

This Court has previously held that the

trial court may inquire to determine if honesty was a factor in
- 6 -

the prior conviction and, if so, the prior conviction is
admissible under Utah R. Evid. 609 (a)(2). 765 P.2d 18.

If the

crime does not involve dishonesty or false statement, the trial
court then considers admissibility under 609(a)(1), determining
whether it was punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year,
then weighing probativeness against prejudice to determine
admissibility. Id.
Larceny is defined in Virginia as "the wrongful or
fraudulent taking of personal goods of some extrinsic value,
belonging to another without his assent, and with the intention
to deprive the owner thereof permanently".
619 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1985).

Berryman v. Moore,

The Virginia court has also

held that one who knows that property is stolen and assists in
its disposition or transportation is guilty of larceny.
v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 290 S.E.2d 891 (1982).

Moehring

Defendant

was convicted of grand larceny for acting as the middleman
between his friend who stole the cars and the individual(s) who
were to dispose of the cars.

Defendant's participation in the

scheme involves fraud or dishonesty, not by participation in the
original theft, but in acting as if he had a legitimate right to
dispose of property which he knew to be stolen.

Even if

defendant's particular action in disposing of the vehicles to a
fence did not involve dishonesty (in that the fence probably knew
the cars were stolen), the entire scheme involved deception in
the ultimate disposition of the cars.

Therefore, it would be

reasonable to determine that defendant's conviction involved
false statement or dishonesty.

Defendant's prior conviction was also admissible under
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1).

Grand larceny is punishable in Virginia

by confinement of not less than one year nor more than twenty
years.

VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-95 (1950, as amended).

The trial

court specifically found that the prior conviction was more
probative than prejudicial and it could be used as impeachment
(T.24).

Although the trial court did not specifically enumerate

each of the factors listed in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1334 (Utah 1986), it is clear that the court weighed the
appropriate issues before making his ruling.
POINT III:
ASSUMING THE COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE PRIOR CONVICTION,
SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Error is reversible only if there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more* favorable result absent the error. Wight,
765 P.2d 19. Defendant has failed to establish any likelihood of
an acquittal absent evidence of the prior conviction.

Two

security guards testified that they observed defendant for
approximately ten minutes. During that time, both formed the
opinion that defendant was behaving suspiciously and that he was
going to shoplift the sunglasses.

Defendant spent a significant

amount of his time looking at the other shoppers and clerks while
supposedly shopping for sunglasses. He also spent considerable
time "switching" the glasses, alternately trying on the pair he
entered the store with and the Nordstromfs glasses.

After

returning a pair of glasses to the box, defendant placed the box
so the clerk would not be able to see into it and left the
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department.

One of the security guards took immediate possession

of the box in which was found a pair of obviously used and worn
sunglasses.
Defendant denied that he behaved suspiciously and
claimed that he inadvertently walked out with Nordstrom's
glasses.

The jury was entitled to reject his testimony as

incredible and self-serving.

One passing reference to a prior

felony conviction, elicited by defense counsel, likely had little
bearing on the ultimate outcome given the eyewitness testimony of
the two prosecution witnesses.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellee requests this Court
to affirm the conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

)5^

day of October, 1990.

JANICE L. FROST
Attorney for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Janice L. Frost, do hereby certify that I delivered four
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Robert L. Steele,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, #300,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this JC^XN day of October, 1990.
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